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Abstract 
The principles of maximum entropy and of minimum cross-entropy (ME-principles) 
provide an elegant and reasonable tool to represent quantified uncertainties within a 
probabilistic framework. The results the application of these principles yield are not 
only well behaved in a statistical sense but prove to be inferentially sound. In this paper, 
we generalize the ME-approach by introducing a scheme for adapting a given prior dis- 
tribution to new conditional information. This scheme is based on conditional-logical 
arguments, and the ME-adaptation is shown to be a special instance of it. Though 
the scheme is far from capturing the whole inferential power of the ME-approach, it 
parallels it with regard to important features. In particular, independent and irrelevant 
information is dealt with in the same manner. Thus certain properties which are consid- 
ered to be characteristic of ME-inference turn out to be due to its conditional-logical 
behavior. © 1998 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved. 
Keywords: Maximum entropy; Minimum cross-entropy; Conditional logic; Probabilistic 
logic; Quantified uncertain reasoning; Nonmonotonic inference 
1. Introduction 
When designing an expert system, it is a wel l -known and fastidious problem 
how to represent knowledge and how to infer f rom it. I f  the expert knowledge 
is to consist of  uncertain quantif ied rules in the context of  statistical investigat- 
ions, probabi l ist ic  logics seem to be an adequate means, providing a convenient 
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and sound handling of uncertainty. The naive probabilistic approach, however, 
suffers from a weighty drawback: given a set ~ of quantified rules, there are 
usually a great many distributions which might represent them probabilistical- 
ly, and the need of a "best probabilistic model" arises. It is commonly argued 
that the one distribution should be preferred which maximizes entropy with 
respect o the knowledge given because it yields best expectation values (cf. 
e.g. [1,2]). Moreover, if the principle of minimum cross-entropy is applied in- 
stead of that of maximum entropy it is even possible to take prior knowledge 
P into account so as to allow updatings of existing knowledge bases. 
In this paper, we are primarily interested not in the statistical but in the log- 
ical features of the approach based on Minimum cross-Entropy (ME). Here 
two papers [3,4] provided essential insights. Both show that minimizing 
cross-entropy resp. maximizing entropy may serve as a logically consistent in- 
ference pattern. Shore and Johnson [4,5] succeeded in characterizing (cross-)en- 
tropy as the only functional whose optimization satisfies four (resp. five) 
fundamental xioms of probabilistic inference: statistical independence is being 
respected (system independence); conditionals with disjunct antecedents may be 
treated independently (subset independence); the solution is uniquely deter- 
mined and possesses certain invariance properties. A similar result is proved 
for entropy in [3] by Paris and Vencovskfi without assuming that inference is 
being performed by optimizing a functional but relying heavily on solving lin- 
ear equational systems. 
Among the properties tated in [3-5] which seem to be most important and 
typical for the ME-adaptation are independence properties. They serve as a jus- 
tification of the assertion that entropy-optimal distributions do not introduce 
dependencies others than those explicitly given by P and ~. We are going to 
prove in this paper that mere independence may already be achieved by a sim- 
ple adaptation scheme which guarantees the preservation of the conditional 
structure in P as far as possible. The ME-adaptation is an instance of this 
scheme. On the one hand, this shows that the ME-principle involves much 
more inferential power than mere respecting non-information. On the other 
hand, the conditional-logical point of view helps to reveal the mechanisms 
which are effective in ME-adaptation. 
This paper is organized as follows: we start with some useful definitions and 
notations in Section 2. A more detailed escription of the starting point of this 
paper is given in Section 3. In Section 4, the ME-distribution isoutlined within 
a conditional-logical framework. Section 5 presents the adaptation scheme 
which generalizes ME-adjustment, and the following two Sections 6 and 7 
make important parallels between the two approaches apparent. We conclude 
in Section 8 with a short summary and an outlook on further research. 
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2. Logical and probabilistic preliminaries 
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Let P denote a probability distribution over a finite set ~ = {Vl, V2,/:3,...} 
of propositional variables V~ which are assumed to be binary. The dotted literal 
bi E {vi, Vi} stands for one of the two possible outcomes of the corresponding 
variable: v~ is to symbolize "V~ is true", and negation is indicated by barring, 
i.e. ~i = ~vg. P is uniquely determined by the values of its probability function 
p applied to the elementary events 09=/)1/)2/)3... , p(og) --p(/)1/)2/)3...)-- 
P(VI =/)1, V2 =/)2, V3 =/)3,...). 
A propositional language ~e = 5°(~)  can be defined in the usual way, using 
the letters of the alphabet ~U and the classical connectives/x (resp. juxtaposi- 
tion) and -~. Thus the elementary events o9 correspond to complete conjunc- 
tions in which each variable of "U occurs either in positive or negated form. 
By identifying elementary events and complete conjunctions syntactically, to 
each well-formed formula F E ~ a probability may be assigned via 
p(F)  = ~, :  F(~o/=l P(Og)' where the sum is taken over all complete conjunctions, 
and F(og) = 1 means that o9 is a disjunct in the disjunctive normal form of F. 
p(F)  reflects the probability that an arbitrary element of the population has 
properties which satisfy F. 
The propositional language ~ is extended to a probabilistic conditional lan- 
guage 5e* by introducing a conditional operator --* and probabilities in the fol- 
lowing way: a probabilistic conditional (or a probabilistic rule, both terms are 
used synonymously) is an expression A --* C[x] with antecedent A E L#, con- 
clusion C E ~ and probability x E [0, 1]. It is to represent syntactically non- 
classical conditional assertions A --+ C weighted with a degree of certainty x. 
A probabilisticfact has the form C[x], C E ~,  x E [0, 1] and is considered to 
be equivalent to the conditional T,-,  C[x], where T represents a tautology. 
L#* = {A ~ C[x]IA , C E ~,x  E [0, 1]} is a flat conditional language, the con- 
ditional operator -~ must not be nested. Antecedent and conclusion of a con- 
ditional are propositional formulas. 
A semantical interpretation of probabilistic onditionals i given by condi- 
tional probabilities: If P is a distribution, we write P ~A,-* C[x] iff 
p(CIA ) = (p(AC)) / (p(A))  = x. In general, we have 
1 iff p(AC) 1 -x  (1) 
x =p(CIA ) = 1 ~_p(AC) ~ - x 
- -  p(dC) 
For a probability distribution P, let Th(P) = {A --* C[x] E 5e* I P ~ A ,-* C[x]} 
denote the set of all probabilistic onditionals which are valid in P. Th(P) ex- 
plicitly represents the conditional knowledge mbodied in P. 
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3. Adaptation to new conditional information 
The problem this note is going to deal with can be described as follows: 
(*) Given a prior distribution P and some new conditional information 
= {Al"*Cl[xl],... ,A,.-~Cn[x,]} C ~*, how should P be modified to yield a 
posterior distribution P* in which all rules of ~ are valid and which still re- 
spects prior knowledge as far as possible? 
The adaptation of existing knowledge bases to new information is one of the 
principle subjects in Artificial Intelligence research. A consistent revision of 
knowledge in the light of new insights is an essential feature of commonsense 
reasoning. Here the problem is treated within a probabilistic framework, re- 
garding probability distributions as the basic concept for knowledge represen- 
tation. To avoid possible inconsistencies between prior and posterior 
probabilistic information, we assume the prior distribution P to be positive, 
i.e. p(o~) > 0 for all elementary events co. 
From a statistical nd information-theoretical point of view, the answer to 
the question (*) above should be clear. Many authors (cf. e.g. [1,2,6-8]) argued 
in eloquent words as well as by proving important statistical properties, that 
adaptation tonew probabilistic knowledge should be performed via the princi- 
ple of minimum cross-entropy. This means P* should be chosen as the solution 
of the optimization problem 
min R(Q,P) -- Zq(o9  ) log q(°~) 
o~ p(¢o) (2) 
s.t. Q is a probability distribution with Q ~ ~. 
Here R(Q, P) = ~,o q(~) log (q(~o)/p(~o)) denotes the cross-entropy (also called 
relative entropy) between Q and P. It is a well-known information-theoretic 
measure of dissimilarity between two distributions and has been studied exten- 
sively (for a brief, but informative introduction and further eferences cf. [8- 
10]). If the prior distribution is the uniform distribution P0, minimizing 
cross-entropy with respect o P0 is equivalent to maximizing the entropy 
H(Q) = -~--]~ q(to) log q(co) of Q. Therefore the maximum entropy prh~ciple 
can be considered to be a special case of the principle of minimum cross-entro- 
py. We refer to both principles as the ME-principle, where the abbreviation ME 
stands both for Minimum cross-Entropy and for Maximum Entropy. 
Yet in spite of its elegance and inferential soundness, the ME-principle 
sometimes seems a bit obscure because the logical mechanisms that make up 
its outstanding position are not quite clear. What actually makes a probabilis- 
tic conditional A.-*C[x] being ME-inferred from P and ~? 
We will show in this paper that some of the fundamental properties being 
attached to ME-inference in [3] and [4], in particular its behavior when dealing 
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with independent and irrelevant information, are due to a simple adaptation 
scheme which underlies ME-updating. This adaptation scheme arises from 
conditional-logical considerations, thus revealing some of the logical mecha- 
nisms which are effective in ME-inference. We refer to the works of [3] and 
of [4] to compare the generalized conditional-logical pproach to the ME- 
approach. 
In the following section, the ME-solution of (2) is given in a more intelligible 
form which fits the conditional-logical framework of this paper. 
4. The  ent ropy-opt ima l  distr ibut ion 
Let ~ = {AI~CI [x l ] , . . .  ,A , . - *C , [x , ]}  C £,e* be a (consistent)set ofprobabi- 
listic conditionals. The condition Q D ~t imposed on a distribution Q can be 
transformed equivalently into a system of linear equality constraints for the 
probabilities q(m). Thus the set of admissible solutions is a convex set, and 
the optimization problem (2) possesses a unique solution P* which may be writ- 
ten in the form 
p*(~o) = cop(e)) U ~/- '  H ~' (3) 
i: A iC/ (o~)=I  i: AiCi(og)=l 
(cf. e.g. [6]). The ais are exponentials of the Lagrange multipliers, one for each 
conditional in ~, and ~0 = exp (2o - 1), where 2o is the Lagrange multiplier of 
the constraint ~,o q(~o) = 1. The product presentation (3) of P* already re- 
ceived some attention (cf. e.g. [7]). Cheeseman [11] used it for an effective cal- 
culation of conditional probabilities. Here another epresentation f the otis is 
relevant. Because of the imposed conditions p*(CdAi ) = xi,  1 <~ i <~ n, o~1,. . . , (~n 
are solutions of the nonlinear equations 
1 -- X i AjCj(o,)=l AjCj(~o)=I 
O~ i - -  
Xi EfO:Aiei(¢o)=l p (O)  Hj¢:i, O~j j H j#i  ' 
ajt j (o, )=l  AjCj(~)=] 
.3 " -1~ 
(4) 
and a0 arises as a normalization factor. Each ai symbolizes the impact of the 
corresponding rule when P is modified. It depends decidingly on the prior dis- 
tribution P, the other rules and probabilities in ~ and - in a distinguished way 
- on the probability of the conditional it corresponds to. 
In spite of the deterrent complexity of the formulas above, Eq. (3) shows 
rather clearly how the adjustment to a rule is carried out: Apart from the nor- 
malization factor ~0, only the probabilities of those complete conjunctions e9 
are changed which satisfy the antecedent of this rule. And the new probability 
depends in addition on whether co satisfies the conclusion or not. Thus the 
probabilities of all conditionals of Th(P) whose antecedents are not touched 
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by any of the rules in ~ remain unchanged. This means that the ME-adapta- 
tion respects one of the most fundamental principles of conditional logics: As- 
serting a conditional should only affect significantly the knowledge about states 
which the conditional may be applied to. 
The following example illustrates how a prior distribution is modified when 
being adapted to a simple conditional. 
Example. Let P be a distribution over ~ = {V1, V2}. Let ~ = {vl --~vz[x]}. The 
application of Eq. (3) yields the posterior distribution 
p*(VlV2) = ~00ff-lpl, p* (VlV2) 0~0P3 ~
P* (UIV2) = 0~0~Xp2, P*(~I~2) = ~0P4 
where - according to Eq. (4) and by a simple calculation - 
1-x  p(ab) P*(~) 
x 4° ) 
This shows that ~ is the cross-product ofa posterior ratio and a prior ratio. The 
normalization factor ~0 balances prior and posterior information about the an- 
tecedent. 
5. A simple adaptation scheme preserving conditional structures 
In the last section, we argued that ME-adaptation is sound in a fundamental 
conditional-logical sense. We are now going to investigate if we can generalize 
the scheme (3) and still maintain some convenient properties provided by the 
ME-principle. This indeed is possible. 
The integration of a new conditional should polarize these elementary events 
that affirm the conditional (i.e. satisfy the antecedent and the conclusion) and 
those elementary events that contradict the conditional (i.e. satisfy the anteced- 
ent but violate the conclusion) so that the demanded proportion arises. In 
Eq. (3), this effect is achieved by factors ~' and ~i -1 where ~i is determined 
by Eq. (4). In simplifying and generalizing this approach, one can conceive 
of a pair of non-negative distortion factors (~[, c~/) associated to each rule 
Ai--* Ci [xl] in a set ~ = {A1 "-, C] [x[ ] , . . . ,  A, --~ C, Ix,] } of probabilistic ondition- 
als, and an adaptation P ,  N of the distribution P to the new conditional infor- 
mation N may be defined in a constructional way by the scheme 
i: AiCi((o)=I i: AiCi(o3)=l 
To ensure that the rules of N are all valid in the posterior distribution P*, the 
factors ~+ and c~[ have to be chosen in a suitable way. The conditions 
xi = p*(CdAi) for 1 ~< i~< n yield the following equations: 
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(1 -x , )~ + ~ p(o9)n  ~f n c~]- 
to: AiCi(to)= 1 j#i j¢i AjCj(o)) I Ajdj(o))=l 
=XiO~: Z p(O.)) H ~;  H 0~7 
to: AiCi(to)=l J7£i j#i Ajc/,ol=t Ajc/o,)=l 
or, in a concise form, 
Eto:~,c/to~=, p(@ 1-I,,, ~+ H,,, 
O~ + x i ,~c~(o,)=t a~cj(,~)=~ 
~F 1 -- X i 2to:AiC,(to)=l p((D) H j¢, 
AjCj(,o)=I 
with ~- = 0 iff xi = 1. 
% 
ajCj(~)=l 
(6) 
(6') 
Finally, ~0 is a normalization factor that makes P* a probability distribution. 
Of course the posterior distribution P* depends on the solution 
+ - p, + - . (~+,~[ , . . . ,%,%) ,  i.e. = P* [~- ,~[ , . . . ,~ , ,%]  
P * ~ shall denote any distribution of the form (5) which solves the adap- 
tation problem P* ~ ~. 
Comparing Eq. (5) to Eq. (3) and Eq. (6') to Eq. (4) reveals the parallels be- 
tween the ME-adaptation and this generalized approach. The quotient 
~i := (~-/~-) depends on P, xi and the other ~+ and c~f, playing again a decid- 
ing role for the adjustment. 
6. Independence and irrelevance 
The following proposition will show that system independence which Shore 
and Johnson [4] proved to be characteristic for ME-adaptation also holds 
for adaptations according to the scheme (5). 
Proposition 1. Let ~tF = ~U1 U ~[/'2 be a partition of the set of variables uch that 
~Ul and ~2 are (statistically) independent with respect to P, i.e. p(colCO2) = 
p(col)p(o22) for all complete conjunctions o9i on variables of ~//'i, i = 1,2. Let 
Pi = P(~Ui), i = 1,2, denote the marginal distribution on ~f i. 
Let ~1 = {AI "~C1 [xl],... ,Ak'~Ck[xk]} and ~2 = {Ak+l "-* Ck+l [xk+l],..., A¢~--* 
@ [x~] } be sets ofprobabilistic onditionals on the variables of ~U~ resp. ~U2. Then 
each solution of P , (~1 U ~2) may be represented as a product of solutions of 
(P * ~1) and (P * ~2): 
P*  (~'i U~2) = (P* ~',)(P* ~2). (7) 
In particular, ~U 1 and ~U 2 are still independent with respect o P • (~1 U ~2). 
Prone Let P* = P .  (~1 U ~2) be defined by the tuple (c~-, ~i-,..., ~[, ~k-, 
~+ ... ~+ ~7), that means k+l ~ ~k+l ~ ~ d~ 
238 G. Kern-lsberner I Internat. J Approx. Reason. 19 (1998) 231-246 
with 
H H (8) 
l<~i<~: l~i<~: 
AiCi(o~)=l AiCi(o3)=l 
(1 -- Xl)C{7 Z p((.O)n 0~; n 0~; 
co: AiCi(co)=l l~j~dj#i 1 <~j<~d,]#i 
AiCj(eo)--I AiOj(o9)=l 
=x'°~7" Z p(oo) H ~+ n ~],l<~i<~:. 
AjCj(~o)=I aicj(e,)=l 
Each complete conjunction co may be written in the form 09 = ( .o1( .o2 ,  where a~i 
are complete conjunctions on the corresponding sets of variables. Because all 
conditionals in ~ l  only touch variables in WI, we have AiCi(~o)= 
l ¢=#AiC i (ah)=l  for l<~i<~k, and an analogous argument shows 
AiCi(co) = 1 ¢=~ AiCi(o)2) : 1 for k < i ~< :. Taking account of the indepen- 
dence assumption p(~olo92) = p(o~l)p(~02), we obtain from (8) for 1 ~< i ~< k
(1-x,)~/+ ~ p(a~,)p(oo2) H ~+ I I  ~+ 1-I ~] 1-I ~] c°1~2 j#i,l<<j<~k j4i,k<j<~: j#i,l<~j<~k j~i,k<j<<.: 
AiCi(Wl) =1 AjCj(o~I)=I AjCj(eo2)=I ASCj(~OI)=I AjCj(o'2)=I 
therefore 
-~-XiO~]- Z P(('OI>((D2) H ~; H 0{; H 0{; H 0~;, 
0~1¢° 2 j#i,l<~j<<.k j#i,k<j<~E j#i,l~j<~k j#i,k<j<~E 
AiCi(o91)=l AjCj(oq)=I AjCj(o~2)=I AjCj('Ol)=I AjCj(¢o2)=I 
O31: AiCi(Ol)=l j#i.l<~j<~k j#i,l<.j<~k 
*sq(~ol)=l *jcj(~l)=l 
j~i,k <j <~ f j#i,k <j <. ? 
AjCj(o~2)=l AjCj(~o2)=l 
rOl: Ai~i(~Ol)=l j#i,l~j~k j~i,l<~j<~k 
AjCj(~°I)=I AjCj(¢°I)=I 
092 j~i,k<j <~ g j#i,k<j <~ EAjCj(~2)=I A:j(o,2)=l 
Because the second factors on both sides are equal (they do not depend on i), 
this implies 
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(1--Xi)~+( Z P(I)(¢OI) I-[ ~f 1-I ~]-) 
(o1: ~iCi(¢Dl) =|  j#i,l~j<<.k j#i,l<~j<~k 
AjCj(O31)=I AjCj(ml)=I 
= Xia~ ( Z P(1)(Wl) 1-I a; l- I ~)  " 
This proves (~,ai-,... ,a~-,a~-) to be a solution both of (P ,~2,)  and of 
(P1 * 2!  ). Using an analogous argument for indices i with k < i ~< ¢, we see that 
+ ... ~+ (ak+l, a*+l, , e, e~-) is a solution both of (P * 22) and of (P2 * 22). Con- 
versely, the equations above show that each solution (fl~, fl~-,..., fl~-, fl~-) of 
+ - + 22) is also a solution of (P l *2 , )  resp. (flk+,,flk+,,''''flt,fl;) of (P2* 
(P*~I )  resp. (P .22) ,  and  concatenating both we obtain a solution 
+ _ + 
, , k ilk-, "'" fl~,flT) of P*  ilk+l, flk+~, , (2! 12 ~2)- Thus according to 
(8), the posterior distribution P* can be written as 
p*(¢o) = p*(~o,a~2) = ~0p(o),a~2) 1-I ~i+ 1-I 
l<~i<~g l~i<.[ 
AiCi(WlO'2)--I AiC/(~'1 o~2)=1 
II II II =7 II 
1 <~i<~k k<i~? 1 <~i<.k k<i<~? 
AiCi(~Ol )=1 AiCi('oZ)=l Aidi(~l)=I Aid,(~oZ)=t 
l<~i<~k l<<.t<~k k<i<~¢ k<i<~[ Aici(o~l):t AiCi(,~l)=l Aici(oJz)=l AiCi(,oz)=~ 
This implies 
p * (2, U 22)(oJ,co2) = (p * 21)(o~1)(p * 22)(o32) (9) 
(the normalization factor a0 has to be split adequately). This proves (7). The 
marginal distributions can now be calculated easily as 
p*(~Ol) = Zp*(ahe~2) = Z (P * 21)((DI)(P * ~¢~2)(('02) 
fO 2 tO 2 
= (p • 2,)(0~,) Z (P * 22)(~02) -- (p * 2 , ) (~, ) ,  
0) 2 
i.e. 
p*  (21 t3 22)(¢ol) =p*  21(~Ol), 
and analogically 
p * (21 (--J 22)((/)2) = p * 22(0)2)- (10') 
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Thus due to Eqs. (9), (10) and (10'), ~e'l and 3e'2 are still independent with res- 
pect to P .  (~1 U~2). [] 
According to Proposition 1, independent information about independent 
systems is handled independently. This is the statement of the system indepen- 
dence (Axiom 3) of [4]. Moreover, Eqs. (10) and (10') show that information 
irrelevant o the variables considered oes not have any impact on the poste- 
rior marginal distribution. Thus the adaptation scheme P *~ satisfies Principle 
3 of [3] in a more general form. Paris and Vencovsk~i only addressed the max- 
imum entropy principle, that is they dealt with the special case where the prior 
distribution is uniform. Here, however, prior information might be arbitrary, if 
it only renders ~l  and 3U" 2 independent. 
Paris and Vencovsk~i stated another independence principle for a particular 
type of constraints (Principle 6 of [3], see Proposition 2 below). In a very sim- 
plified form, it deals with (conditional) independences with respect to common 
variables. This is an important prerequisite for a global distribution to arise out 
of a system of marginal distributions (cf. [12]). Applying these techniques to in- 
ference networks (e.g. Markov networks), it is possible to reduce global com- 
putations to local computations. Without this simplification, high-dimensional 
distributions would hardly be representable and manageable. We do not want 
to continue these subjects here, but refer to the literature (cf. e.g. [12-15, 17]). 
We now formulate Paris and Vencovsk~i's Principle 6 in a slightly general- 
ized form and show that it is satisfied by our adaptation scheme P .  ~. 
Proposition 2. Let P be a distribution over three propositional variables Vl, V2 
and I13, and let ~ consist of  the probabilistic facts VlV3[X1] , V2V3[X2] and 
va[x3]: ~ = {vlva[xl], v2va[x2], v3[x3]}. I f  in P the equation 
p(v, v2v3) -- p(vl v3)p(v2v3) (11) 
p(v3) 
holds, then in P * ~ the analogous equation 
p * ~(v,v2v3) -- p * ~(vlva)p * ~(v2v3) = XlX2 (12) 
p * ~(v3) X3 
holds. 
Proof. The next lemma will show that irrelevant variables can be neglected. 
Thus without loss of generality VI, 112 and V3 may be supposed to be the only 
variables P is defined on (or else we investigate the corresponding marginal 
distribution). The following table shall provide an easy survey of the 
modifications of P caused by ~ and make calculations in the posterior 
distribution easier: 
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P P*~I 
+++ 
/)1/-)2/33 Pl 0¢0P1~1 ~2 ~3 
/)1V2~3 P2 ~OP2~I ~2 ~3 
/)1 ~2/)3 P3 0¢0P3 ~+ 0¢2 0¢3 - 
Vl V2 V3 P4 ~oP4~l ~2 Ct3 
~1 D2/)3 P5 ~oPs~l-~f~ 
VlV2V3 P6 ~0P6~I C¢2 ~3 
UIV2/)3 P7 O~oP70~l 20~f 
Expressed in terms of the pi, (11) becomes 
(P, +P3)(Pl +Ps) 
Pl = (Pl +P3 +P5 +P7) '  
which is equivalent to 
PlP7 = P3p5. 
Within the adjusted istribution P*= P ,  ~, we have 
+ + + xl = p*(viv3) = ao~, a3 (Pl~2 +P3~2) 
that gives us for ~; 
+ + + 
x~ - ~oP~l ~2 ~3 
= 
In the same manner x2 = p* (02/)3) implies 
+ + + 
x2 -- ~oPl~l °~2 ~3 
0~1= + + 
0¢0P5 ~2 ~3 
Substituting these equations in 
+ + + 
x3 = p*(v3) = ~0~3 (pia, ct 2 + p3ct[ct 2 + p, ctlC¢- ~+ P7~;~2 ), 
we obtain 
x3 = Xl +x2 -p*(vlv2v3) +plP7 ( XlX2 
P3P5 \p*(vlv2v3) 
=x l ( l  _PlP7~ +xz(1 p,P7) 
P3P5 / -- P3Ps / 
(13) 
Xl --X2A-p*(VlV2V3)) 
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m 
because 
_p,(vlv2v3)(1 p ip7)+p~p7 XlX2 
P3P5 p3psp*(vlv2v3) 
( ) plP7XlX2 
1 _PlP7p3p5 (Xl + X2 --p*(VlV2V3)) d papsp*(VlVzV3) 
XlX2 
p*(VlV2V3) 
of (13). This proves (12). [] 
As a minor result, Proposition 1shows that irrelevant information does not 
affect he posterior marginals (cf. (10) and (10')). As a counterpart, Lemma 3 
now is going to deal with irrelevant variables: variables not touched by the con- 
ditionals which the distribution is to be adapted to do not play any role when 
calculating the updated relevant marginal distribution. We omit the straight- 
forward proof. 
Lenuna 3. Let ~1 be a set of probabilistic onditionals involving only variables of 
a subset Vl of V. Let Pl be the marginal distribution of P over 111. Then for every 
solution P* of P • ~1 there is a solution P*I of P1 * ~1 with p*(o91) = p~(ool). 
7. Effects on conditional distributions 
In the last chapter, we were able to prove that important independence and 
irrelevance properties hold for any adaptation process following scheme (5). 
Yet the actual logical power of the approach (5) is revealed by Lemma 4 
and Theorem 5. 
Lemma 4 will show that all solutions of P ,  {C[x]) yield the same distribu- 
tion P* which is identical to that gained by proportional scaling. This is to say 
that learning the fact C[x] and updating P according to (5) with any solution of 
the corresponding system (6) does not change the probability of any condition- 
al with C or C as antecedent, i.e. we have p* (~olC) = p(oglc). This allows of a 
probabilistic modus ponens inference, using the conditional structure of P 
when instantiating C with any probability. 
Theorem 5may be considered even more important. It states that condition- 
als with pairwise exclusive antecedents may be treated independently of each 
other and independently of the probabilities attached to their antecedents, 
and that the adaptation process (5) is coherent with the interpretation f con- 
ditionals as facts on conditional distributions. 
Lenuna 4. Let P be a distribution, and/et ~ = {C[x]}. Then all solutions to 
P * {C[x]} are identical to 
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x C(co) = 1, 
p-7C5: 
P* withp*(co) =p(co) 1 -_x: C(co) -- 0 .  
p(C) 
Proof. Let P~ = PI[~ +, ~-] be a solution to P * {C[x]}, i.e. 
) f  ~+: C(co) = 1 
Pl (co) = ~0P(co / ~-: C(co) = 0 
with 
- ( ()) ~- 1-  x p (C)  ' ~o = .+p(C)  + ~-p  C . 
The first equation yields a -=~+((1 -x ) /x ) (p (C) /p (C) ) ,  thus implying 
~0 -- ~x  = ~--~b~'~-~ This proves the lemma. [] 
Theorem 5. Let cg= {AI~CI[Xl],...,A,'~C,[xn]} be a set of probabilistic 
conditionals with pairwise exclusive antecedents Ai. Let Y l , . . . ,  Y, E [0, 1] be real 
numbers with ~Y i  <<. 1, and let ~- = {A1 [Yl],... ,A,[vn]} be a set of facts which 
attach a probability to each of the antecedents of the rules in cg. Let both 
conditional and factual information be contained in ~ = cg tA ~-. Then for each 
i, 1 <~ i <<. n, the following equations hold for the conditional distributions." 
p,  ~( .  IA~) = p ,  cg(. IA~) = P(-IAi) * {Ci[x~]}. (14) 
Proof. Let P1 =P l [~- , , ] - ,  + - + . . . ,c~, ,~, , f l l  , f l l - , ' " , f l+,f l~] be a solution of 
P .  ~,  and let i, 1 < i < n, be arbitrary, fixed. We will omit some of the 
straightforward calculations and concentrate on the essential arguments. 
For any complete conjunction co with AiCi(co) = 1, we have Ai(co) = 1 in 
particular, and therefore A;(co) = 0 for each j ~ i, because all antecedents are 
exclusive. Thus 
+ - (AiCi~ ~,.+_ xi E,o:~,c,(~)=lP( co)/~, I-I;~i/~: _ x~ P"  " (15) 
CO + ~7 1 - xi Eo,: A,c,(~,)=l P( )fl, ~I)~i fl) 1 - xi p(AiC,) 
So any quotient (~,.+/~-) depends neither on any other quotient (~+/~f) nor on 
any quotient (/~f//~v-) belonging to the factual information. In particular, 
+ - • 
P1 [~,  ~-, • • -, ~,, ~n ] IS a solution of P ,  cg 
According to the construction of P~, we have 
y, -- p, (Ai) = ~ofl + H fl; ( ~+ p(AiC,) + ~;p(A,e,) ). (16) 
j¢i 
Eq. (15) above yields 
o~+p(AiC,) + ~;p(Aiei)  - -  
o~+p(AiCi) 
\ /  xi 
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thus 
= xiyi (17) 
0~0 °~+p(AiCi)fl + Hj¢i fl; 
from Eq. (16). 
For all co with Ai(co) = 0 Eq. (14) holds trivially. Now let co be a complete 
conjunction with Ai(co) = 1. According to the definition of conditional proba- 
bilities and by substituting (17), we have 
{oC: AiCi(oJ) = 1, 
I I / F  A,C,(<,,) = 1, pl(aJ[Ai) Yi jet 
xi (~+: A,C,(og) = 1, 
=P-C°) + v ~;: Aifi(0)) 1, 
and again by using Eq. (15), we finally obtain 
x¢ AiCi(o9) = 1, [ p(AiCi): 
(18) p,  ~(colAi ) = p(~o) / 1 _x~ Aifi(o)) 1. 
(p(A iC i )  
Note that in (18) none of the factors of the solution 
(~{,~1, .  •• ,~n+,~,-, fl+,fl[, • ,fl+n,fl~) occur nor does p • ~(.[A~) depend upon 
t+ t- Yi. So if P2 = P2 [~'l +, ~1'-, ""  , ~, , ~, ] is a solution of P * cg, the same arguments 
as above show for ~o with A~(~o) = 1. 
xi AiC,(aJ) = 1, 
pzffOlaD = p(oD p(A,C~): 
1 - xi AiCi(og) = 1, : " 
thus proving the first of the equations in (14). 
For the second equation, we apply Lemma 4 to the marginal PA, := P('IAi). 
Let P7 be a solution ofPA, * {Ci[x~]}. According to Lemma 4, we have 
[ xi 
~ :  <(o~)= 1, 
p*(og) = p,,(cn) / 1 - xi. 
G(aD O, ! 
t pA, (C,)" 
and by canceling p(Ai), this results in 
xi 
. f p(A-TCi): A,C,(oo) = 1, 
p*(o~) = p(~)  I 1 - x i .  - 
t p(A,C,)" AiC,(oJ) 0. [] 
The statement of Theorem 5 is equivalent to what is called subset indepen- 
dence in [4]. In the context of that paper, constraints are defined by use of (con- 
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vex) subsets of states, and in the case of discrete distributions, these subsets 
may be represented by propositional formulas. Thus the independent subsets 
of [4] here correspond to exclusive antecedents. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we showed that a simple scheme (5) for adapting a prior dis- 
tribution to posterior conditional information which generalizes the minimum 
cross-entropy approach shares ome important properties with that much more 
powerful approach. In short, it respects independence and irrelevance of infor- 
mation and treats conditionals as facts on the corresponding conditional distri- 
butions. These properties are fundamental to ME-adaptation, and they are 
realized perfectly by (5). 
In a later paper [16] we show that a characterization f ME-adaptation on the 
base of (5) is indeed possible. Only three further assumptions are necessary to 
achieve at this characterization: First, the arbitrariness of solutions (~/+, c~-) of 
(6) is restricted by introducing afunctional concept that assumes (~+, ~-) to de- 
pend upon their common quotient (~/~- )  and upon the probability xi of the 
corresponding conditional. The other two postulates we impose on the solution 
of our adaptation problem (*) are logical consistency (a resulting posterior dis- 
tribution should be used consistently as prior knowledge for a further adapta- 
tion process) and representation i variance (the solution should not depend 
upon the way probabilistic information is represented). Moreover, in [16] it is 
shown that (5) may be axiomatized by a formal property called conditionalpres- 
ervation which is to preserve interactions between variables as far as possible. 
The properties of independence and irrelevance, however, are not mentioned 
explicitly in [16] because they are already inherent o (5), as was shown in the 
present paper. So the results presented here are interesting on their own, pro- 
viding an important connection between the characterizations of ME-inference 
given in [3,4,16]. Moreover~ some readers might prefer the intuitive appealing 
of the approach (5) to the formal axiomatization given in [16]. 
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